Federal Register Notice -- 68 FR 7843-7892 -- 02/18/2003 -- Post-Employment Conflict of Interest Restrictions - Proposed Rule[Federal Register: February 18, 2003 (Volume 68, Number 32)] [Proposed Rules] [Page 7843-7892] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr18fe03-18] [[Page 7843]] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Part II Office of Government Ethics ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 5 CFR Parts 2637 and 2641 Post-Employment Conflict of Interest Restrictions; Proposed Rule [[Page 7844]] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS 5 CFR Parts 2637 and 2641 RIN 3209-AA14 Post-Employment Conflict of Interest Restrictions AGENCY: Office of Government Ethics (OGE). ACTION: Proposed rule. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: Since 1980, 5 CFR part 2637 (formerly 5 CFR part 737) has provided guidance concerning the post-employment conflict of interest restrictions of 18 U.S.C. 207. As a result of amendments to section 207 that became effective January 1, 1991, employees terminating service in the executive branch or in an independent agency (or terminating service from certain high-level Government positions) since that date are subject to substantially revised post-employment restrictions. The purpose of part 2641 is to provide regulatory guidance explaining the scope and content of the statutory restrictions as they apply to employees terminating service on or after January 1, 1991. This proposed rule would expand the guidance previously published in part 2641 as interim or interim final rules and make minor modifications to those earlier rulemakings. It would also remove part 2637 from 5 CFR. DATES: Comments are invited and must be received on or before May 19, 2003. ADDRESSES: Send comments to the Office of Government Ethics, Suite 500, 1201 New York Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20005-3917, Attention: Richard M. Thomas. Comments may also be sent electronically to OGE's Internet E-mail address at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.usoge.gov. The subject line of E- mail messages should include the following reference: ``Comments on proposed post-employment conflict of interest rule.'' FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Richard M. Thomas, Associate General Counsel, Office of Government Ethics; Telephone: 202-208-8000: TDD: 202-208-8025; FAX: 202-208-8037. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A. Substantive Discussion of Post-Employment Regulatory Guidance I. Rulemaking History Since its enactment in 1962, 18 U.S.C. 207 has remained the primary source of post-employment restrictions applicable to former officers and employees of the executive branch and of independent agencies. In 1979 (interim rule) and 1980 (final rule), the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) published regulatory guidance concerning section 207 as codified at 5 CFR part 737 (now 5 CFR part 2637). See OGE's regulations issued at 44 FR 19974-19988 (April 3, 1979), 45 FR 7402-7431 (February 1, 1980), 54 FR 50229-50231 (December 5, 1989), and 56 FR 3961-3965 (February 1, 1991), as amended, redesignated and corrected over the years. Section 207 was substantially revised by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716, with technical amendments enacted by Pub. L. 101-280, 104 Stat. 149 (1990). As a result of these and subsequent amendments, employees terminating Government service (or service in certain high-level Government positions) on or after January 1, 1991, are subject to revised substantive prohibitions. Pursuant to authority set forth in the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, as amended, and Executive Order 12674, as modified by Executive Order 12731 (hereinafter referred to as Executive Order 12674), OGE published executive branch guidance concerning certain aspects of the new version of 18 U.S.C. 207 on February 1, 1991 (56 FR 3961-3965), now codified at 5 CFR part 2641.\1\ For purposes of section 207(c), the 1991 interim rule (1) Established procedures for exempting senior employee positions; (2) designated separate departmental and agency components; and (3) established procedures for future designations and modification of designations of departmental or agency components. The appendices to part 2641 reserved for listings of exemptions and designations were subsequently amended by final rules published at 57 FR 3115-3117 (January 28, 1992), 57 FR 11673 (April 7, 1992), 58 FR 33755-33756 (June 21, 1993), 62 FR 26915-26918 (May 16, 1997), 64 FR 5709-5710 (February 5, 1999), and, most recently, 68 FR 4681-4684 (January 30, 2003). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ OGE also issued, by Memoranda to Designated Agency Ethics Officials, General Counsels and Inspectors General, summaries of the restrictions of 18 U.S.C. 207, as amended, on October 26, 1990, November 5, 1992, and February 17, 2000. The current version of the summary may be found on OGE's Web site at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.usoge.gov under ``DAEOgrams'' for the year 2000. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As described below in the discussions of Sec. Sec. 2641.204, 2641.301(j) and 2641.302 as proposed, this proposed rule would make further minor modifications to existing part 2641. In addition, it would expand part 2641 to provide comprehensive guidance concerning 18 U.S.C. 207 as applicable to individuals terminating service on or after January 1, 1991 (or service in certain high-level Government positions), incorporating amendments to section 207 enacted subsequent to the Ethics Reform Act.\2\ As discussed more fully below, a future rulemaking would supplement the preliminary guidance at proposed Sec. Sec. 2641.203 and 2641.206 concerning 18 U.S.C. 207(b) and (f). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ The statute has been amended several times since the Ethics Reform Act. Section 101(b)(8)(A) of Pub. L. 101-509, 104 Stat. 1389, amended 18 U.S.C. 207(c)(2)(A)(ii) to change the pay-based threshold for purposes of determining the applicability of section 207(c) from the rate for GS-17 to the rate for level V of the Executive Schedule. Section 705(a) of Pub. L. 102-25, 105 Stat. 75 reinstated section 207(k) authorizing Presidential waivers of section 207 in narrow circumstances, a provision that was later amended by Pub. L. 102-190. Section 609 of Pub. L. 102-395, 106 Stat. 1828, amended section 207(f) to extend that one-year restriction to three years in the case of any individual assuming the office of U.S. Trade Representative after October 6, 1992, the effective date of the law. Subsequently, section 21(a) of Pub. L. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691, amended section 207(f)(2) to permanently bar both the U.S. Trade Representative and the Deputy U.S. Trade Representative from engaging in the activities prohibited by section 207(f). Sections 5 and 6 of Pub. L. 104-179, 110 Stat. 1566, changed the rate of basic pay triggering ``senior employee'' status and added a new exception permitting former high-level officials to represent certain candidates and political organizations notwithstanding section 207(c) or (d). Finally, section 102(a) of Pub. L. 105-244, 112 Stat. 1585, made a conforming change to the exception at section 207(j)(2)(B) when it amended the definition of ``institution of higher learning'' in title 20 of the United States Code. (Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 made only two very minor grammatical changes to section 207(c).) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- This proposed rule does not address very limited amendments enacted on December 17, 2002, in section 209(d) of the E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-347. These amendments, which pertain only to assignees from private sector organizations under the newly authorized Information Technology Exchange Program, had not been enacted when the proposed rule was developed and will not be effective until April 16, 2003, subsequent to the issuance of the proposed rule. See section 402(a)(1), Pub. L. 107-347. OGE invites comments concerning interpretation of these amendments--which add a new category of senior employee under section 207(c)(2)(A)(v) and a new restriction on contract advice in section 207(l)--which will be addressed in the final rule, as appropriate. OGE is proposing to discontinue publication of 5 CFR part 2637. Due to the passage of time, employees who terminated service prior to January 1, 1991, could no longer be subject to any of the substantive restrictions of the previous version of 18 U.S.C. 207 other than the permanent bar for particular matters involving specific parties. Former employees, agency ethics officials and other interested parties can continue to consult the last edition of [[Page 7845]] the CFR in which part 2637 was published, for interpretive guidance concerning the permanent bar and relevant exceptions as applicable to employees who terminated service before January 1, 1991. OGE will maintain a copy of part 2637 and suggests that all designated agency ethics officials keep a copy in their files. As required by section 201(c) of Executive Order 12674, OGE is publishing this proposed rule after obtaining the concurrence of the Department of Justice. We also consulted with the Office of Personnel Management pursuant to title IV of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, as amended. Section 402 of that Act provides, among other things, that the Director of OGE shall provide, in consultation with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), overall direction of executive branch policies relating to preventing conflicts of interest, and develop, in consultation with the Justice Department and OPM, rules and regulations pertaining to the identification and resolution of conflicts of interest. Subpart A--General Provisions Proposed Sec. 2641.101--Purpose Proposed Sec. 2641.101(a) explains that 18 U.S.C. 207 does not bar employment with any particular employer. Rather, it prohibits certain acts which involve, or may appear to involve, the unfair use of prior Government employment. The section would stress that the proscribed activities are prohibited even if they are undertaken for no compensation. The section would also note that the restrictions are personal to the employee and that they are not imputed to others, such as a law partner of a former employee. On the other hand, we have inserted a parenthetical cross-reference to the note following proposed Sec. 2641.103 concerning the punishment under 18 U.S.C. 2 of a person or entity who ``aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures commission'' of a violation of 18 U.S.C. 207. Proposed Sec. 2641.101(b) makes two important points. First, it would emphasize that part 2641 provides interpretive guidance concerning the application of 18 U.S.C. 207 to former employees of the executive branch or of certain independent agencies of the Federal Government of the United States, including current employees who formerly served in ``senior'' or ``very senior'' employee positions. Second, although certain of the statute's provisions also apply to former employees of the District of Columbia, Members and elected officials of Congress and legislative staff, and employees of independent agencies in the legislative and judicial branches, the proposed paragraph specifically states that part 2641 is not intended to provide guidance to those individuals. The note following proposed Sec. 2641.101(b) warns that part 2641 does not purport to interpret post-employment restrictions that may be contained in laws or authorities other than section 207. Thus, for example, a former employee must comply with 18 U.S.C. 203 which restricts the acceptance of compensation in connection with certain representational activities undertaken by the employee or others at a time when the former employee was still serving with the Government. Under 41 U.S.C. 423(d), a former agency official may not accept compensation from a contractor for one year as an employee, officer, director, or consultant if the former official: (1) Served in certain procurement positions at the time the contractor was selected for or awarded a contract in excess of $10,000,000; (2) served in certain positions relating to the administration of a contract with the contractor in excess of $10,000,000; or (3) personally made certain decisions valued in excess of $10,000,000 in relation to a contract with the contractor. See 48 CFR part 3. The proposed note does not refer to restrictions contained in any professional codes of conduct, as these are outside the jurisdiction of OGE. The proposed note does not purport to set forth an exhaustive list of all post-employment restrictions, including agency-specific or position-specific restrictions. We were concerned that the burden associated with compiling and maintaining an exhaustive (and accurate) list would outweigh the benefit of such a listing in a regulation intended to provide guidance relating to 18 U.S.C. 207. If history is any indicator, post-employment restrictions are frequently amended, suspended or abolished, then amended again or reinstated (see, e.g., the legislative history of 41 U.S.C. 423(d)). We also foresaw difficulties in defining the standards for inclusion in such a listing. Proposed Sec. 2641.102--Applicability Section 207 has been amended several times over the years. Proposed Sec. 2641.102 traces the most significant of these amendments and explains that, as a consequence of these changes, former employees are subject to varying post-employment restrictions depending upon the date of their termination from Government service (or from a ``senior'' or ``very senior'' employee position). Section 2641.102 as proposed indicates whether an employee should consult 5 CFR part 2637 or part 2641 for regulatory guidance. A note following Sec. 2641.102 as proposed would warn that the guidance in part 2641 incorporates all amendments to 18 U.S.C. 207 enacted after the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 (and the related technical amendments to that Act), except as superseded. Significantly, as would be explained in the note, an individual who terminated Government service (or a ``senior'' or ``very senior'' employee position) before one or more of these amendments became effective would have become subject to a version of section 207 other than that reflected in part 2641 as proposed. The substantive post-Ethics Reform Act amendments have concerned the applicability of sections 207(c), (d), or (f), the waiver authority in section 207(k), and the definition of ``institution of higher learning'' in section 207(j)(2)(B). The one-year restriction of section 207(c) has expired as to any former senior employee covered by a version of that restriction other than that described in part 2641. Moreover, the prior versions of section 207(f) are of relevance only in relation to the length of the restriction as it applied to a former United States Trade Representative or former Deputy United States Trade Representative who terminated service in the early 1990s. And, since the waiver authority in section 207(k) has not yet been utilized, a section 207(k) waiver would, in the future, be granted in accordance with part 2641, once it is finally adopted. As discussed earlier, OGE is proposing to discontinue publication of 5 CFR part 2637. Since proposed Sec. 2641.102(b) indicates that part 2637 should be consulted in relation to employees who terminated service prior to 1991, that section would also note the edition of the CFR in which part 2637 was last published. Proposed Sec. 2641.103--Enforcement and Penalties It is the role of ethics officials, both at OGE and elsewhere, to give advice concerning the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 207. Section 2641.103(a) of the proposed rule notes that agencies are required by 28 U.S.C. 535 to report to the Attorney General any information, allegations, or complaints of possible violations of the laws in title 18 of the United States Code involving Government officers and employees, including violations of 18 U.S.C. 207 by former officers and employees. When a matter involving a Federal conflict of interest law is referred to the [[Page 7846]] Department of Justice by an agency, 5 CFR 2638.603 requires that an agency concurrently notify the Director of OGE of the referral unless otherwise prohibited by law. The Office of Government Ethics has developed an optional ``Notification of Conflict of Interest Referral'' reporting form (OGE Form 202) that agencies can use for this purpose. After the final disposition of a referral, including any disciplinary or corrective action taken by the agency, agencies are required further to notify the Director of such disposition. Proposed Sec. 2641.103(b) cross-references the penalties and injunctions authorized to be imposed for violations of 18 U.S.C. 207. The section refers to 18 U.S.C. 216(a), (b) and (c) which, respectively, set forth the imprisonment terms and criminal fines for felony and misdemeanor violations of section 207, authorize the Attorney General to take actions to impose civil penalties for violations of section 207, set forth fine amounts, and authorize the Attorney General to seek injunctive relief to prohibit conduct that violates section 207. The note proposed to follow Sec. 2641.103 warns that a person or entity who ``aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures'' a violation of 18 U.S.C. 207 is punishable as a principal under 18 U.S.C. 2. Notably, the new version of 18 U.S.C. 207 no longer provides for the administrative sanctions that were formerly authorized by the pre- Ethics Reform Act version of section 207(j). These procedures remain available, however, in the case of employees who terminated Government service prior to January 1, 1991. A number of agencies continue to publish procedures implementing former section 207(j). Given the passage of time, however, agencies may wish to weigh the likelihood that these procedures would be utilized against other factors, including the expense of continued publication and the availability of civil remedies. Proposed Sec. 2641.104--Definitions Proposed Sec. 2641.104 defines a number of terms that are used throughout the regulation. Although the terms are listed in proposed Sec. 2641.104 in alphabetical order, they are discussed here out of order to facilitate our discussion. Other terms or phrases are defined in subsequent sections of the proposed regulation and are discussed further below. The proposed definitions in Sec. 2641.104 generally are intended to be consistent with definitions of the same terms previously published in 5 CFR part 2637. In some cases, we have altered the wording in order to clarify the definition, ensure consistency with other OGE regulations, or add additional information to reflect an OGE, Department of Justice, or judicial interpretation that was not incorporated into part 2637. Several of the definitions were included in the interim rule published in 1991 at part 2641 to permit the immediate exercise of the OGE Director's authority to designate departmental and agency components for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 207(c) and to waive certain positions from sections 207(c) and (f). The proposed rule also would make several modifications to the definitions in existing part 2641 in order to clarify the meaning or update the definitions consistent with current interpretations. The term ``employee'' is used in 18 U.S.C. 207 in a number of contexts. Primarily, the term ``employee'' is used in section 207 to describe the individuals subject to section 207 and to identify the current Government officials with whom post-employment contact is restricted and the decisions of whom a former senior or very senior employee cannot seek to influence on behalf of a foreign entity. The term is, however, used for other purposes in section 207 and in proposed part 2641. Thus, for example, the exception in section 207(j)(2)(A) benefits an individual who becomes an ``employee'' of certain specified entities, such as a State or local government. See proposed Sec. 2641.301(c). Moreover, in the proposed regulation, we use the term ``employee'' to refer to an individual's employment relationship with a non-Federal entity. As proposed, Sec. 2641.104 defines the term for the purpose of identifying the individuals subject to section 207. (The definition would exclude certain individuals who are subject to section 207 but for whom part 2641 was not intended to provide guidance, such as employees of independent agencies in the legislative or judicial branches.) Proposed Sec. 2641.104 emphasizes that the definition is modified elsewhere in the regulation, as necessary, when the term ``employee'' is used for other purposes. Consistent with 18 U.S.C. 202(a) and (c), the term ``employee'' is defined in proposed Sec. 2641.104 to exclude enlisted members of the Armed Forces, the President, and the Vice President (except, with respect to the Vice President, as otherwise provided). Relevant provisions of part 2641 as proposed would specifically indicate that the Vice President is subject to 18 U.S.C. 207(d) and (f) and that, in certain circumstances, communications to or appearances before the President and Vice President are prohibited. For purposes of clarity, the proposed definition of ``former employee'' emphasizes that the Vice President is a ``former employee'' only for purposes of sections 207(d) and (f). The proposed definition of ``employee'' includes an individual appointed or detailed under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA), 5 U.S.C. 3371-3376. The IPA authorizes the assignment of employees of State or local governments (and certain other entities) to Federal agencies. Under 5 U.S.C. 3374(a), an individual who is assigned to a Federal agency may be ``appointed'' in the agency or may be deemed ``on detail'' to the agency. The IPA specifically provides that an individual, whether appointed or on detail to a Federal agency, is deemed an ``employee'' for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 207. 5 U.S.C. 3374(c)(2). The regulation would also acknowledge that an individual may be subject to section 207 under the terms of a statute other than the IPA. The proposed definition of ``employee'' also excludes officers or employees of the District of Columbia. Although former employees of the District of Columbia must comply with 18 U.S.C. 207(a)(1) and (a)(2), proposed Sec. 2641.101(b) emphasizes that part 2641 ``is not intended to provide guidance to those individuals.'' Moreover, we were also persuaded to exclude District of Columbia officials from the definition of ``employee'' since section 207(a)(3) indicates that post-employment contacts with District of Columbia officials are not with ``any officer or employee of any department, agency, court, or court-martial of the United States'' within the meaning of sections 207(a)(1) and (a)(2). ``State'' is defined in proposed Sec. 2641.104 to include the District of Columbia. The definition of ``State'' in 18 U.S.C. 207(j)(7) specifically defines the term as including the District of Columbia. We also propose to define the District of Columbia as a State in view of the exceptions at sections 207(j)(1) and (j)(2) which permit a former employee to engage in otherwise prohibited representational activity on behalf of certain governments. We defined the District of Columbia as a State notwithstanding language in the exception at section 207(j)(1) which, since it refers to the District of Columbia separately, distinguishes the District of Columbia government from State and local governments. In this regard, we noted that the wording of section 207(j)(1) also distinguishes the District of Columbia government from the United States Government. We decided [[Page 7847]] that the District of Columbia must have been listed separately in section 207(j)(1) for purposes of indicating the exception's applicability to former District of Columbia employees who act on behalf of that government. As defined in proposed Sec. 2641.104, ``Government service'' means ``a period of time during which an individual is employed by the Federal Government.'' The proposed definition provides some guidance concerning when service ends in the case of ``special Government employees,'' including some advisory committee members and Reserve officers of the Armed Forces and officers of the National Guard of the United States. As defined in 18 U.S.C. 202(a), a special Government employee (SGE) is an officer or employee of the executive branch or any independent agency ``who is retained, designated, appointed, or employed to perform, with or without compensation, for not to exceed one hundred and thirty days during any period of three hundred and sixty-five consecutive days, temporary duties either on a full-time or intermittent basis * * *.'' Many of these individuals serve the Government only a few days per year, often returning to private sector employment during interim periods. In the case of civilians who serve the executive branch or independent agencies as SGEs, the definition of ``Government service'' proposed in Sec. 2641.104 indicates that Government service refers to ``the period of time covered by the individual's appointment (or other act evidencing employment with the Government), regardless of any interval or intervals between days actually served.'' Thus, sections 207(a)(1), (a)(2), and (b) are not triggered each time there is an interval between the days on which a civilian SGE actually performs work. Example 4 following the definition of ``former employee'' in proposed Sec. 2641.104 is illustrative. In the case of a Reserve or National Guard officer, status as an SGE is related to the performance of active duty or active duty for training. More specifically, unless otherwise an employee, a Reserve or National Guard officer is classified as an SGE only while on active duty involuntarily, while on active duty for training for any length of time, or while serving voluntarily on extended active duty for 130 days or less. See 18 U.S.C. 202(a). The definition of ``Government service'' in proposed Sec. 2641.104 indicates that, in the case of Reserve or National Guard officers, the end of a period of active duty or active duty for training as an SGE is considered the end of Government service for purposes of triggering the application of sections 207(a)(1), (a)(2), and (b). See example 5 following the proposed definition of ``former employee'' in Sec. 2641.104. During periods when not serving on active duty, officers maintain their Reserve or National Guard status--categorized as either ``active'' or ``inactive''--but they are not considered SGEs. Like civilians, Reserve and National Guard officers are, while special Government employees, subject to 18 U.S.C. 203 and 205. Similar to section 207, these statutes restrict an individual's ability to represent others before Federal departments, agencies, or courts. The definition of the term ``executive branch'' derives from 18 U.S.C. 202(e)(1). According to 18 U.S.C. 202(e)(1), the executive branch includes ``each executive agency as defined in title 5, and any other entity or administrative unit in the executive branch.'' The term ``executive agency'' is defined in 5 U.S.C. 105 to mean ``an Executive department, a Government corporation, and an independent establishment.'' The ``Executive departments'' are enumerated in 5 U.S.C. 101. Accordingly, proposed Sec. 2641.104 states that the term ``executive branch'' includes ``an Executive department as defined in 5 U.S.C. 101, a Government corporation, and an independent establishment (other than the General Accounting Office) * * * and also includes any other entity or administrative unit in the executive branch.'' The definitions of the ``judicial'' and ``legislative'' branches are from corresponding definitions in 18 U.S.C. 202(e)(2) and (3). Following 18 U.S.C. 202(e)(3)(B), we include the General Accounting Office (GAO) in our proposed definition of ``legislative branch'' and specifically exclude GAO from our proposed definition of ``executive branch.'' We determined that it would be appropriate to define the term ``Government corporation'' by reference to two separate statutory provisions, one in title 5 and one in title 18 of the United States Code. For purposes of determining the employees subject to 18 U.S.C. 207, we propose to use the definition of ``Government corporation'' in 5 U.S.C. 103. As defined in that section for purposes of Government personnel rules, a Government corporation means a corporation owned or controlled by the Government of the United States. In contrast, we propose to rely on the definition in 18 U.S.C. 6 when necessary to identify the employees with whom post-employment contact is restricted, to describe matters to which the United States is a party or has a direct and substantial interest, to specify the decisions of whom a former senior or very senior employee cannot seek to influence on behalf of a foreign entity, and to explain when an activity will be deemed undertaken on behalf of the United States. A corporation is an ``agency'' as defined in 18 U.S.C. 6 if it is a corporation ``in which the United States has a proprietary interest.'' The Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel has distinguished a proprietary interest from one that is merely ``custodial or incidental'' as determined by reference to the corporation's ``functions, financing, control, and management.'' 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 84 (1988). The proposed definition incorporates this Office of Legal Counsel guidance. As defined in proposed Sec. 2641.104, an individual becomes a ``former employee'' at the termination of Government service. Examples following the proposed definition of former employee illustrate the combined effect of this definition and those of ``employee,'' ``executive branch,'' and ``Government service.'' Notably, proposed example 3 emphasizes that former employee status is triggered when an employee terminates Federal service. Thus, the example points out that an individual who served in a GS-14 position did not become a former employee when he terminated service in the executive branch to accept a position in the legislative branch. This result is dictated by language in 18 U.S.C. 207(a)(1), (a)(2) and (b) indicating that those restrictions commence when ``service or employment with the United States'' terminates. In contrast, we indicate that status as a ``former senior employee'' or ``very senior employee'' is triggered (for purposes of sections 207(c), (d), and (f)) at the termination of service in a senior or very senior position. This distinction appears both in the proposed definition of ``former employee'' and in proposed definitions of ``former senior employee'' and ``former very senior employee.'' The proposed revised definition of ``senior employee'' at Sec. 2641.104 reflects the post-Ethics Reform Act of 1989 amendment of 18 U.S.C. 207(c) by the Office of Government Ethics Authorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-179. Prior to the amendment of section 207(c)(2)(A)(ii) by that Act, section 207(c) applied, inter alia, to employees occupying positions for which the rate of basic pay was equal to or greater than that payable for level V of the Executive Schedule (EL-V). The amendment replaced the EL-V threshold with the [[Page 7848]] rate of basic pay payable for level 5 of the Senior Executive Service (ES-5). Proposed example 2 following Sec. 2641.104 reflects our conclusion in OGE Informal Advisory Letter 92 x 20 that step increases, or their equivalent, must be considered in determining whether an employee's basic rate of pay equals or exceeds the threshold rate of basic pay. In a subsequent advisory letter, we observed that this interpretation is not limited to the SL (senior level) or ST (scientific or professional) positions that were the subject of OGE Informal Advisory Letter 92 x 20. In the subsequent advisory letter, we stated that ``[i]n general, for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 207(c)(2)(A)(ii), the ``rate of basic pay'' for any pay system refers to the base amount of actual pay for each individual employee, not the minimum rate of pay for a position's authorized pay range (footnote omitted).'' OGE Informal Advisory Letter 98 x 2. Both OGE advisory letters, along with the others cited in this rulemaking document, are included in The Informal Advisory Letters and Memoranda and Formal Opinions of the United States Office of Government Ethics, as published by the U.S Government Printing Office, and are also available on OGE's Web site at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.usoge.gov. Admirals and Generals in the uniformed services (``flag'' officers) are senior employees because, as specified in 18 U.S.C. 207(c)(2)(A)(iv), they are ``employed in a position which is held by an active duty commissioned officer of the uniformed services who is serving in a grade or rank for which the pay grade is * * * pay grade O-7 or above.'' A flag officer becomes a senior employee once ``frocked.'' When frocked, an officer is authorized to wear the stars of the higher rank and to serve in a specified flag officer billet. He does not, however, receive the pay and allowances authorized by law for pay grade O-7 until he is actually promoted to that pay grade. We invite comment from the military departments concerning our interpretation of section 207(c) as it applies to flag officers. As first published in part 2641 in early 1991, the term ``senior employee'' was defined to include individuals detailed to a position otherwise considered to be a senior employee position. We have revisited our earlier interpretation and propose to delete the reference to details. Our earlier interpretation was largely based upon a reading of 18 U.S.C. 207(g). Since that section indicates that an individual's former agency would include one to which the individual had been detailed, we stated in the regulation that a detail to a senior employee position would trigger senior employee status for purposes of determining the applicability of section 207(c). Upon further review of this issue, we now deem it more significant that the statute generally defines senior employee positions by reference to rate of pay (except in the case of Presidential or Vice Presidential appointments under title 3 of the United States Code). In the case of Senior Executive Service employees who are detailed, an employee continues to be the incumbent of the position from which detailed for purposes of pay and benefits. 5 CFR 317.903(a). Accordingly, we are proposing to delete the reference to details in existing Sec. 2641.101 from our revised definition of senior employee in proposed Sec. 2641.104. Compare OGE Informal Advisory Letter 98 x 4 in which we determined that an employee was a ``senior employee'' under 18 U.S.C. 207(c)(2)(A)(i) because she was, despite her election to continue to receive the SES pay of her previous position, employed in an Executive Schedule position. For the reasons discussed above in connection with the definition of ``senior employee,'' the proposed definition in Sec. 2641.104 of ``very senior employee'' differs from that previously published in part 2641 in relation to details. Separately, it should be noted that since the definition of ``very senior employee'' encompasses any employee who satisfies any of the criteria enumerated in proposed subparagraphs (1)- (4) of the definition, the definition may encompass an SGE. However, there is no provision exempting any former very senior employee from 18 U.S.C. 207(d) based upon length of service. Compare proposed definition of ``senior employee'' in Sec. 2641.104. Section 207(d) applies to, among others, any person who ``is employed in a position * * * at a rate of pay payable for level I of the Executive Schedule'' (emphasis added). Therefore, the current definition of ``very senior employee,'' found in existing section 2641.104, would be modified slightly in the proposed rule to reflect the apparent intent of Congress that the restriction apply to any individual employed in a level I position, or in a position in a pay system other than the Executive Schedule for which the rate of pay is exactly equal to--but not greater than--the level I rate. See Memorandum for Kenneth R. Schmalzbach, Assistant General Counsel, Department of the Treasury, from Daniel Koffsky, Acting, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 207(d) to Certain Employees of the Treasury Department (November 3, 2000), available under ``Other Ethics Guidance, Conflict of Interest Prosecution Surveys and OLC Opinions'' on OGE's Web site, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.usoge.gov. Proposed Sec. 2641.104 reflects a similar Congressional judgment in relation to the application of section 207(d) to individuals serving in the Executive Office of the President. The terms ``agency'' and ``department'' are used throughout 18 U.S.C. 207. The definitions of both terms in proposed Sec. 2641.104, respectively, are from 18 U.S.C. 6. These terms appear in sections 207(a)(1) and 207(a)(2), for example, in connection with identifying those employees to and before whom communications and appearances may not be made. See proposed Sec. 2641.201(f). They similarly identify the scope of the representational bars set forth in sections 207(c) and 207(d). See proposed Sec. 2641.204(g). They are also used in 18 U.S.C. 207(f) for purposes of identifying the decisions of whom a former senior or very senior employee cannot seek to influence on behalf of a foreign entity. Significantly, these terms were not defined for purposes of identifying those former employees to whom the various restrictions of section 207 apply. We are proposing to include any ``independent agency'' not in the legislative or judicial branches within the scope of our definition of ``agency.'' Even the ``United States'' is a ``person'' as that term is defined in proposed Sec. 2641.104; sections 207(a)(1), (a)(2), (b), (c), and (d), prohibit post-employment activity that is undertaken on behalf of (or to assist) ``any other person (except the United States).'' In some places in the proposed regulatory text, we use the terms ``person'' and ``entity'' together even though the first term encompasses the latter. The terms ``agency ethics official'' and ``designated agency ethics official'' are defined due to their use in a number of places in the regulatory text, including in proposed Sec. 2641.105 concerning advice, in proposed Sec. 2641.301 concerning exceptions and waivers, and in proposed Sec. 2641.302 concerning separate departmental or agency component designations for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 207(c). Finally, as this regulation is intended to be gender-neutral, proposed Sec. 2641.104 indicates that the terms ``he,'' ``his,'' and ``him'' include ``she,'' ``hers,'' and ``her,'' and vice versa. Proposed Sec. 2641.105--Advice Proposed Sec. 2641.105(a) indicates that current or former employees and others should seek advice concerning 18 U.S.C. [[Page 7849]] 207 and part 2641 from an ``agency ethics official.'' The latter term is defined in proposed Sec. 2641.104 as encompassing the designated agency ethics official (DAEO), the alternate DAEO, and any deputy ethics official as described in subpart B of 5 CFR part 2638. Proposed Sec. 2641.105(a) notes that the agency in which the employee formerly served has the primary responsibility for providing such advice and that the agency may seek assistance from OGE. Proposed Sec. 2641.105(a) does not require that agency advice be reduced to writing, although that format can provide the most protection to the employee. We expect that the decision whether to provide oral or written advice will be dictated by the circumstances. An individual's former agency remains the primary source of advice. Agency officials are more familiar with agency programs and policies than are OGE personnel, and questions arising under section 207 often require a detailed understanding of the facts surrounding agency operations. However, OGE personnel also will provide advice to current or former employees, including their representatives or non-Federal employers, as outlined in proposed Sec. 2641.105(b). Based on its statutory responsibilities for the executive branch ethics program, OGE may provide advice in a matter where an agency has already provided a former employee with advice. While OGE strongly encourages agencies to establish mechanisms to ensure that departing employees will receive advice concerning pertinent post-employment restrictions (see, e.g., 5 CFR 2638.203(b)(6) and (7)), this regulation as proposed would not require the agency to set up any particular system in order to achieve this goal. The Office of Government Ethics is aware that some agencies require that employees meet with an agency ethics official as one step in the exit process. Others have developed systems that identify terminating employees who can then be provided with written materials concerning the post- employment laws. Although reliance on the oral or written advice of an agency ethics official or OGE is a factor that will be taken into consideration by the Department of Justice when selecting cases for prosecution, proposed Sec. 2641.105(c) warns that there may be circumstances that would cause the Department to initiate a prosecution notwithstanding the former employee's reliance on such advice. The regulation would distinguish any case in which OGE issues a ``formal'' opinion. See 5 CFR 2638.309. Proposed Sec. 2641.105(e) would advise that there is no attorney-client relationship formed when a current or former employee seeks advice from an agency attorney concerning post-employment restrictions. Thus, an agency or OGE attorney is obligated to report violations of law to appropriate authority. See, e.g., 5 CFR 2635.101(b)(11). Section 2641.105(d) of the proposed rule emphasizes that a former employee does not risk a violation of 18 U.S.C. 207 when he contacts an agency ethics official, attorney, or other Government employee for the purpose of seeking prospective advice concerning the potential applicability of the statute to his own post-employment activities. Subpart B--Prohibitions Proposed part 2641 draws heavily from the language and explanations in 5 CFR part 2637 concerning provisions of 18 U.S.C. 207 that were not amended by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 (or thereafter). However, we have incorporated a number of improvements designed to facilitate understanding of this very complex statute. We have organized part 2641 as proposed in a manner that we feel more clearly highlights the applicability, duration, and elements of each of the substantive provisions of section 207 that apply to former employees of the executive branch and independent agencies. In addition, more guidance is included concerning the scope of the statutory exceptions. We have also included new and more numerous examples. However, the examples are illustrative, not comprehensive. Each agency may provide additional illustration and guidance to its own employees, consistent with this part, in order to address specific problems arising in the context of a particular agency's operations. It is important to emphasize that the examples in part 2641 were drafted to illustrate the scope and meaning of 18 U.S.C. 207 only. Activity that is represented as permissible under section 207 may be prohibited by another post- employment law. Proposed Sec. 2641.201--18 U.S.C. 207(a)(1) Section 207(a)(1) of title 18, United States Code, sets forth the permanent bar that was designated as section 207(a) in the pre-Ethics Reform Act of 1989 version of section 207. The target of this restriction is the former employee who participates personally and substantially in a particular matter involving a specific party or parties while employed by the Government and who later ``switches sides'' by representing another person on the same matter, with the intent to influence, before a Federal department, agency, or court. Proposed Sec. 2641.201(b) provides cross-references to the appropriate paragraphs of proposed Sec. 2641.301 for each of the exceptions and waivers that in certain circumstances negate the prohibition contained in 18 U.S.C. 207(a)(1). Proposed Sec. 2641.201(d)--Communication or Appearance Section 207(a) bars certain communications to or appearances before the United States. Proposed Sec. 2641.201(d) describes the statutory communication or appearance element. Although section 207(a) has been amended several times since 1962--and the operative language describing the offense in section 207(a)(1) has varied--OGE and the Department of Justice have long held that it covers only those actions involving some representational contact by the former employee with the Government. E.g., 2 Op. O.L.C. 313 (1978); OGE Informal Advisory Letter 82 x 13. The current statutory language reinforces the longstanding view that some communication or appearance by the former employee is required for a violation of the statute. The definition of ``communication'' at proposed Sec. 2641.201(d)(1) is intended to be all-inclusive with respect to types of communication, content of communication, or means of communication. This intentionally broad definition covers all formal or informal communications of any sort; to the extent that a given communication might be thought trivial or insignificant, such issues may be dealt with in connection with other statutory elements, especially the requirement that the communication be made with the intent to influence the Government. See proposed Sec. 2641.201(e). The definition of ``appearance'' at proposed Sec. 2641.201(d)(2) largely follows the language of 5 CFR 2637.201(b)(3). However, the proposed regulation focuses solely on physical presence and omits the reference, found in Sec. 2637.201(b)(3), to ``convey[ing] material to the United States in connection with a formal proceeding or application.'' The latter phrase is unnecessary, since the conveying of material, such as pleadings and other documents, typically would constitute a ``communication'' anyway. See 5 CFR 2637.201(b)(3) (example 1) (under old rule, appearance included submitting brief in agency proceeding). Under the [[Page 7850]] statute as it existed prior to the 1989 amendments, it was more important to distinguish appearances from mere communications, as the two types of contacts were treated differently for certain purposes that are no longer relevant under the current statutory scheme. See 44 Federal Register 19974, 19975 (April 3, 1979) (preamble to 5 CFR part 737, now 5 CFR part 2637); OGE Informal Advisory Letter 81 x 35. Proposed Sec. 2641.201(d)(3) emphasizes that section 207(a) does not prohibit ``behind-the-scenes assistance'' that involves no contact by the former employee with the Government. See, e.g., Beverly Enterprises, Inc. v. Trump, 182 F.3d 183, 191 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 795 (2000). Proposed example 5 is derived from a recent opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel, and it illustrates the principle that a former employee does not confine herself to permissible behind-the-scenes activity when she conveys information to the Government through an intermediary and does so with the intent that the information be attributed to her. See Memorandum for Amy L. Comstock, Director, OGE, from Joseph R. Guerra, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, OLC, January 19, 2001, available under ``Other Ethics Guidance, Conflict of Interest Prosecution Surveys and OLC Opinions'' on OGE's Web site, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.usoge.gov. In this connection, see also proposed example 7 following proposed Sec. 2641.201(f), which would illustrate the related point that a communication will be deemed to be made ``to'' an employee of the United States if it is conveyed to an employee through a third party with the intent that the information be attributed to the former employee. Proposed Sec. 2641.201(e)--With the Intent to Influence Section 207(a) prohibits only those communications or appearances that are made with the intent to influence the United States. Proposed Sec. 2641.201(e) describes this statutory element of intent to influence. Prior to the 1989 amendments, the phrase ``with the intent to influence'' modified only ``communication,'' not ``appearance.'' See S. Rep. No. 170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 152-53 (1977); OGE Informal Advisory Letter 81 x 35.\3\ After the 1989 Act, it became clear that both appearances and communications must be made with the intent to influence in order for a violation of section 207(a) to occur: ``Any person who * * * knowingly makes, with the intent to influence, any communication to or appearance before * * * .'' 18 U.S.C. 207(a)(1). (Identical language also appears in sections 207(a)(2), 207(c)(1), and 207(d)(1).) It is unclear, however, to what extent this 1989 change really altered the executive branch's understanding of section 207(a): ``appearance'' had been used in conjunction with the statutory phrase ``acts as agent or attorney for, or otherwise represents,'' and OGE had already determined that this meant an appearance was prohibited only ``if there were an actual or potential dispute.'' OGE Informal Advisory Letter 81 x 35. See also 5 CFR 2637.204(e), 2637.201(b)(5); 2 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 313, at 316. As discussed more fully below, the existence of an actual or potential dispute is one of the recognized factors for determining intent to influence. Compare 5 CFR 2637.204(e) (under old rule, same standard for ``acting as representative'' and ``attempting to influence''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ The Senate Report discussion and OGE Informal Advisory Letter 81 x 35 specifically pertained to section 207(c), but they were relevant also to section 207(a), because ``[p]rior to the effective date of the amendments enacted by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, both sections 207(a) and 207(c) contained identical language describing the nature of the representational activity prohibited.'' OGE Informal Advisory Letter 96 x 14, n. 25. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Proposed Sec. 2641.201(e) uses basically the same test for the intent to influence as the prior section 207 regulations. See 5 CFR 2637.204(e). As articulated in the proposed regulation, the intent to influence may be found if the communication or appearance is made for either of the following purposes: ``(i) [s]eeking a Government ruling, benefit, approval, or other discretionary Government action; or (ii) [a]ffecting Government action in connection with an issue or aspect of a matter which involves an appreciable element of actual or potential dispute.'' Proposed Sec. 2641.201(e)(1)(i) and (ii). In some respects, paragraph (1)(i) might be viewed as a subset of subparagraph (1)(ii), in the sense that any time a communication or appearance is made to seek ``discretionary'' Government action, there is at least the potential for a conflict of positions or other dispute between the Government and the private party being represented. Nevertheless, consistent with the prior section 207 regulations, OGE believes that it is appropriate to emphasize that any representational contact made for the purpose of seeking discretionary Government action would meet the element of the intent to influence. The proposed regulation draws on various provisions in the prior regulations, as well as more recent administrative and judicial precedents, to provide guidance on when the intent to influence is present. Proposed Sec. 2641.204(e)(2) sets out situations that generally have been recognized as involving no intent to influence. Several of the paragraphs in proposed Sec. 2641.201(e)(2) repeat provisions or examples found in the prior section 207 regulations and other OGE precedents. For example, proposed Sec. 2641.201(e)(2)(iii)-- signing a tax return prepared for another person--and Sec. 2641.201(e)(2)(v)--submitting an SEC Form 10-K--basically reiterate examples found in 5 CFR 2737.204(e). Some provisions in the proposed regulation make certain clarifications to the language used in the prior section 207 regulations and other OGE precedents. For example, proposed Sec. 2641.201(e)(2)(iv), read in conjunction with proposed Sec. 2641.201(d) (example 4), substantially preserves 5 CFR 2637.204(g) (example 1), pertaining to various aspects of the Federal grant application process and service by former employees as principal investigators, but clarifies the rationale. The proposed rule intentionally does not carry forward the provision on project responses in 5 CFR 2637.201(b)(7) because this provision was thought by OGE to be susceptible to misinterpretation. In OGE's experience, the project response provision and the accompanying example sometimes have been construed as allowing former employees inappropriate latitude in communicating with the Government where there may be a potential for controversy in the course of performing Government contracts or submitting proposals or reports to the Government. In its place, OGE has provided example 5, following proposed Sec. 2641.201(e)(2), in order to emphasize the limits on communications during the performance of contracts, particularly in the difficult area of contracts to perform professional or managerial studies or similar services for the Government. Proposed examples 3 and 7 also provide additional guidance concerning the scope of permissible contacts in connection with Government contracts. Some of the situations addressed in proposed Sec. 2641.201(e)(2) pertain to communications and appearances that involve certain types of factual statements or questions, e.g., proposed Sec. 2641.201(e)(2)(ii). OGE has long recognized that certain statements of fact, in appropriate circumstances, do not necessarily involve an intent to influence the United States. See, e.g., OGE Informal Advisory Letter 80 x 9. Factual statements, however, are not per se excluded from section 207(a). Factual disputes often are the heart of a given controversy, and a former employee's [[Page 7851]] characterization of the material facts can be a form of advocacy. See, e.g., proposed Sec. 2641.201(e)(2) (example 4) (dealing with efforts to persuade Government of safety and efficacy of new drug based on presentation of testing data). Congress recognized this by providing exceptions to section 207, such as the exceptions for scientific or technological information and testimony under oath, which permit certain factual statements, but only under specified safeguards. See proposed Sec. 2641.301(e) and (f). It is clear that factual statements may be made with the intent to influence the Government, if they are made for the purpose of seeking discretionary Government action or affecting Government action in connection with an issue or aspect of a matter involving an appreciable element of dispute. Therefore, OGE was careful, in various proposed textual provisions and examples pertaining to factual statements (or appearances in connection with factual matters), to include circumstances that specifically would indicate that there is no intent to influence. A word of caution is in order with respect to the application of proposed Sec. 2641.201(e)(1) and (2). The presence or absence of the intent to influence typically will be based on a consideration of all the relevant circumstances in a given case. The facts of each case should be examined carefully, therefore, before any conclusion is reached that a particular activity would fall within any of the provisions of proposed Sec. 2641.201(e)(2) indicating no intent to influence, or would more correctly be viewed as meeting the test for the intent to influence in proposed Sec. 2641.201(e)(1). Proposed Sec. 2641.201(e)(3) makes explicit a principle that was already implicit in the prior section 207 regulations. See Sec. 2637.201(b)(5) (example 1). This provision recognizes that certain communications or appearances may commence without any intent to influence the Government, but may take on a different character if unforeseen disputes or other changed circumstances arise. In these cases, the former employee must refrain from any further communication or appearance if it becomes apparent that such further contact would be made with the intent to influence. Proposed Sec. 2641.201(e)(4) emphasizes that a mere appearance, even without any accompanying communication by the former employee, may be prohibited by section 207(a). As one court put it, applying the pre- 1989 language, a representational appearance by a former employee may be covered ``with or without speaking for the client.'' United States v. Coleman, 805 F.2d 474, 480 (3d Cir. 1986).\4\ Phrased another way, silent appearances can be made with the intent to influence. This conclusion is compelled by the language and history of the statute. The language of section 207(a)(1) explicitly covers former employees who make, ``with the intent to influence, any communication to or appearance before'' the Government (emphasis added). Historically, as discussed above, representational appearances actually were covered per se, even without any explicit requirement of ``intent to influence,'' although it was recognized even prior to the 1989 amendments that the appearance must have been made under circumstances involving ``at least inchoate adversariness.'' 2 Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 316. There is nothing in the legislative history of the 1989 Act to indicate that the addition of an explicit ``intent to influence'' element in connection with appearances was intended to relax the restriction on representational appearances as it had been understood previously. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ Coleman involved the application of former 18 U.S.C. 207(b)(1), but that statute contained the same language concerning the representational conduct prohibited as section 207(a), prior to the 1989 amendments. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The question becomes, then, what circumstances would indicate that physical presence alone, without any substantive communication, is intended to influence the Government? The second sentence of proposed Sec. 2641.201(e)(4) provides a nonexhaustive list of factors that can be relevant to such determinations. Many of these factors are derived from judicial and administrative precedents. See, e.g., Coleman, supra; United States v. Schaltenbrand, 930 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1991); OGE Informal Advisory Letter 82 x 7. Although no one factor is necessarily determinative, these and any other relevant factors should be considered in light of the totality of the circumstances in a given case. Proposed Sec. 2641.201(f)--To or Before an Employee of the United States The post-Ethics Reform Act of 1989 version of 18 U.S.C. 207(a)(1) prohibits communications to or appearances before any ``officer or employee'' of any ``department, agency, court, or court-martial of the United States or the District of Columbia * * *.'' The prior version of the permanent bar had also prohibited communications to and appearances before ``any civil, military, or naval commission of the United States or the District of Columbia, or any officer or employee thereof.'' We believe the current version of the permanent bar no longer lists ``civil, military, or naval commission'' because these commissions are encompassed within the remaining terms. For purposes of summarizing the section 207(a)(1) restriction as briefly as possible at proposed Sec. 2641.201(a), we refer to an employee ``of the United States'' rather than repeating the words ``department, agency, court, or court- martial.'' Proposed Sec. 2641.201(f) is titled accordingly. Although a court-martial is held under the auspices of a department, we chose to specifically list this forum in order to avoid possible confusion. Moreover, proposed Sec. 2641.201(f) does not distinguish between ``department'' and ``agency,'' because the definition of ``agency'' includes ``department.'' See proposed Sec. 2641.104. The term ``employee of the United States'' is defined at proposed Sec. 2641.201(f)(1) for purposes of identifying those individuals with whom post-employment contact is restricted. The proposed definition specifically includes an individual who, under 5 U.S.C. 3374(a), is considered an employee because appointed or detailed under the IPA. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 207(i)(1)(A), it also encompasses the President and the Vice President. Section 207(i)(1)(A) specifically states that ``the term ``officer or employee,'' when used to describe the person to whom a communication is made or before whom an appearance is made * * * shall include in subsections (a), (c), and (d), the President and the Vice President.'' More generally, the proposed definition of ``employee of the United States'' at Sec. 2641.201(f)(1) includes any ``Federal employee'' who is ``employed by'' an agency, court, or court-martial. Our choice of words was guided by a number of factors. First, 18 U.S.C. 207(a)(1) states that a communication or appearance is barred only if directed to an ``employee'' of a department, agency, court, or court-martial. We specifically intend that the words ``employed by'' would exclude from the scope of section 207(a) those communications directed to a non- Federal employee who happens to be serving in a department, agency, court, or court-martial. However, as illustrated in proposed example 7 following Sec. 2641.201(f), we recognize that there may be circumstances in which a communication to a non-Federal employee is actually directed to a Federal employee. Proposed Sec. 2641.201(f)(1)(i) specifies that an agency encompasses a Government corporation. While the [[Page 7852]] term agency encompasses any independent agency, proposed Sec. 2641.201(f)(1)(ii) emphasizes that the representational bar extends to contacts with employees of an independent agency in any of the three branches of the Federal Government. Notably, proposed example 1 following Sec. 2641.201(f) as proposed would highlight the fact that Members of Congress and their staffs are not employees of an independent agency in the legislative branch. Proposed Sec. 2641.201(f)(1)(iii) modifies the term ``court'' with the adjective ``Federal'' in order to distinguish State or other non-Federal courts. Of course, as has been described in several OGE Informal Advisory Letters, a communication made in a court has ``the additional unavoidable intent of attempting to influence and to persuade'' a Federal party in the lawsuit, regardless of the forum. OGE Informal Advisory Letter 80 x 6. Moreover, a former employee may be prohibited from contacting Federal employees for use as witnesses or otherwise in connection with a lawsuit in State court. OGE Informal Advisory Letter 82 x 13. Proposed Sec. 2641.201(f)(1) omits the District of Columbia from the list of entities to or before which communications and appearances may not be made. As clarified in 18 U.S.C. 207(a)(3), the District of Columbia is listed in section 207(a)(1) merely as a consequence of the permanent bar's applicability to former District of Columbia employees. Thus, a former employee of the District of Columbia is covered by section 207(a)(1) in relation to contacts back to the government of the District of Columbia, but former employees of the executive branch (and of independent agencies) are not restricted by section 207(a)(1) from contacting employees of the District of Columbia. Our definition of ``to or before'' in proposed Sec. 2641.201(f)(2)(i) indicates that a communication or appearance will be considered directed to an employee of an agency, court, or court- martial even though not addressed to any particular employee of the entity. We believe it would be inconsistent with the purpose of 18 U.S.C. 207 to permit communications to a Federal entity merely because they are not addressed to a named individual. In proposed Sec. 2641.201(f)(2)(ii), we specify that a communication or appearance must be directed to an employee ``in his capacity as an employee of'' an agency, court, or court-martial. Proposed examples 2, 3, and 4 following proposed Sec. 2641.201(f) are illustrative. While a former employee is not prohibited from lobbying a legislative branch employee at a meeting, example 2 emphasizes that a former employee may not try to influence an employee of an independent agency who is participating in the same meeting. Example 3 indicates that the permanent bar would extend to communications directed to an executive branch employee who is assigned by his agency to carry out official Government duties as a member of the Board of Directors of a non-Federal entity. The employee would be acting in his capacity as an executive branch employee even when, as in the proposed example, he is considering a specific issue of most interest to the private sector entity. (Separately, of course, the issue must be of direct and substantial interest to the current employee's agency, as described in proposed Sec. 2641.201(j).) The proposed wording of Sec. 2641.201(f)(2)(ii) is also intended to address the situation in which a former employee directs a communication to a former employee in a social setting. Although the current Federal Communications Commission (FCC) employee in proposed example 4 is ``off-duty'' at the cocktail party, the former employee nevertheless directs his communication to the FCC employee in his capacity as an employee of that agency. As proposed, Sec. 2641.201(f)(2)(ii) indicates that a former employee does not ``direct'' his communication to a mere bystander. Beyond this, we considered whether 18 U.S.C. 207(a)(1) should be interpreted as also not extending to a variety of situations in which a former employee directs a communication to a current employee who has no official role in a forum, yet who is participating in the forum as more than a mere bystander. We considered, for example, a number of situations in which a communication is directed to an assembled group. As we observed in OGE Informal Advisory Letter 81 x 5(1) in relation to the scope of section 207(c), the concern is the extent to which section 207 ``might require [a former employee] to survey who his audience was before he argued a certain position to any group of individuals.'' Proposed Sec. 2641.201(f)(3) permits a former employee to serve as a speaker if the forum ``[i]s not sponsored or co-sponsored by an entity specified in paragraphs 2641.201(f)(1)(i)-(iv) of this section, [i]s attended by a large number of people, and [a] significant proportion of those attending are not employees of the United States.'' See OGE Informal Advisory Letters 81 x 5(1), 81 x 5(2), It is our intention that former employees not be prohibited from addressing what are essentially public forums. The regulation may depart somewhat from past guidance in that it states that employees otherwise permitted to address such fora may engage in debate with any other panel participants or with members of the audience who happen to be current employees without fear of being found to have made a prohibited communication. In a public setting outside the context of official decision-making, such incidental exchanges between participants are still primarily directed towards the audience. Under proposed Sec. 2641.201(f)(3), private sector sponsorship of a forum, standing alone, does not free a speaker or panel participant from his post-employment restrictions. The forum must be in the nature of a conference, seminar, or similar forum; the audience must be large; and a significant proportion of attendees must be persons other than Federal employees. We considered whether to specify a minimum number of attendees and/or a maximum percentage of Federal employee attendees. In some settings, a communication is directed to so wide an audience that it cannot be said to be made ``to'' Federal employees in the audience. And while some audiences will plainly fall on one side or the other of a line drawn for this purpose, a precise line as to the size and composition of such an audience cannot be drawn. Former employees should appreciate the risks of violating section 207 before agreeing to address a forum when it is unclear whether proposed Sec. 2641.201(f)(3) applies. In this regard, former employees may be guided by the size of the conference and the proportion of non-employee attendees in proposed example 5. The regulation would deal with published writings in a similar fashion. A former employee may ``permit the broadcast or publication of a commentary provided that it is broadcast or appears in a newspaper, periodical, or similar widely-available publication.'' As proposed example 7 would indicate, a communication can be made ``to'' an employee of the United States if it is conveyed through an intermediary with the intent that the information be attributed to the former employee. A similar point is discussed above in connection with proposed example 5 following Sec. 2641.201(d) as proposed, which would illustrate the distinction between permissible behind-the-scenes activity and communications directed to the Government. [[Page 7853]] Proposed Sec. 2641.201(g)--On Behalf of Any Other Person Proposed Sec. 2641.201(g) defines the phrase ``on behalf of'' for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 207(a)(1), (a)(2), (c) and (d). As enacted in 1962, the lifetime restriction originally barred a former employee from acting as ``agent or attorney'' for anyone. Similarly, the predecessor of current section 207(a)(2), concerning matters under an employee's official responsibility, originally barred a former employee from appearing personally as ``agent or attorney.'' These restrictions were amended by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 to extend to the former employee who acts ``as agent or attorney for, or otherwise represents, any other person * * * in any formal or informal appearance * * * or * * * makes any oral or written communication on behalf of any other person.'' Congress used this same language in 1978 when it enacted section 207(c), the one-year ``cooling-off'' restriction applicable to former senior employees. Since the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, these three restrictions have barred a former employee from making any ``communication to or appearance before'' an employee of the United States ``on behalf of'' any other person. The same language appears in section 207(d), the one-year cooling-off restriction applicable to former very senior employees. We determined that a communication or appearance that is in the interest of another person is not sufficient to be considered ``on behalf of'' that person. Accordingly, the proposed definition at Sec. 2641.201(g)(1) states that ``[a] former employee does not act on behalf of another merely because his communication or appearance is consistent with the interests of the other person, is in support of the other person, or may cause the other person to derive a benefit as a consequence of the former employee's activity.'' While we recognize that the terms ``agent'' and ``attorney'' no longer appear in the current version of the permanent, two-year, or one-year cooling-off restrictions, proposed Sec. 2641.201(g)(1) indicates that when a former employee acts as another's ``agent'' or ``attorney,'' he necessarily acts on behalf of the principal. Even when a former employee is not acting as an agent or attorney, however, proposed Sec. 2641.201(g)(1) recognizes that a former employee may nevertheless act on behalf of another provided the criteria at proposed Sec. 2641.201(g)(1)(i) and (ii) are satisfied. As specified in proposed Sec. 2641.201(g)(1)(i), the former employee must be acting with the consent, express or implied, of the other person. And, as specified in proposed Sec. 2641.201(g)(1)(ii), the former employee must be subject to some degree of control or direction by the other person in relation to the communication or appearance. The former employee in example 2 following proposed Sec. 2641.201(g) has broad authority to further the interest of the organization with which she is serving as a volunteer. For purposes of the consent requirement in proposed Sec. 2641.201(g)(1)(i), the organization is deemed to have consented to her dispatch of the letter to the Government. In contrast, the circumstances in proposed example 3 would indicate that the former employee is not acting on behalf of the nonprofit group with which he is serving as an employee. OGE has fielded many questions from agencies that wish to contact former employees who have gone to work for private sector employers. We have generally been counseling that all relevant factors must be considered, including the relationship between the communication or appearance and any related interest of the former employee's new employer or other organization with which he is affiliated. See, e.g., OGE Informal Advisory Letter 97 x 9. We believe that the focus on the two factors at proposed Sec. 2641.201(g)(1) would make certain contacts between an agency and its former employee less problematic and would allow OGE and agency ethics officials to advise accordingly. An appearance or communication is barred by 18 U.S.C. 207(a)(1), (a)(2), (c), or (d) only if made on behalf of ``any other person.'' Proposed Sec. 2641.201(g)(2) cross-references the definition of ``person'' in proposed Sec. 2641.104, but specifically states that self-representation is not prohibited. Proposed example 1 following proposed Sec. 2641.201(g) is illustrative. Proposed Sec. 2641.201(g)(2) also includes a reference to sole proprietorships that is intended to distinguish that form of business enterprise from partnerships and corporations for purposes of the ``exception'' for self-representation. The proposed rule reflects that a corporation is a person separate from its owner or owners. As a result, if a former employee chooses to incorporate his consulting business, he must ensure that his communications with the Government do not run afoul of the post-employment statute's requirements since he will be representing another ``person.'' On the other hand, if the same former employee had chosen not to incorporate his business, he would be free to interact with current Government employees without fear of violating section 207(a)(1) since he would be representing only himself. Proposed Sec. 2641.201(h)--Particular Matter Involving Specific Parties Proposed Sec. 2641.201(h) explains a concept that has been central to the understanding of 18 U.S.C. 207 since its original enactment in 1962. The phrase ``particular matter'' is broadly defined in section 207(i)(3) to include ``any investigation, application, request for a ruling or determination, rulemaking, contract, controversy, claim, charge, accusation, arrest, or judicial or other proceeding.'' In section 207(a)(1) and (2), however, particular matter is modified by the additional phrase ``which involved a specific party or specific parties.'' See B. Manning, Federal Conflict of Interest Law 204 (1964) (explaining significance of the phrase); 2 Op. O.L.C. 151 (1978) (same). Proposed Sec. 2641.201(h) is intended to explain the nature and scope of this statutory element. The proposed regulation uses basically the same test for particular matters involving specific parties that is used in 5 CFR 2637.201(c). Proposed Sec. 2641.201(h)(1) states: ``These matters involve a specific activity or undertaking affecting the legal rights of the parties or an isolatable transaction or related set of transactions between identified parties, such as a specific contract, grant, license, product approval application, enforcement action, administrative adjudication, or court case.'' One minor change worth noting is that the proposed regulation speaks of ``identified'' parties, whereas section 2637.201(c)(1) used the term ``identifiable'' parties (following identical language originally found in B. Manning, supra, at 204). This change is consistent with the more recent definition of particular matter involving specific parties in 5 CFR 2640.102(l). See 60 FR 47207, 47211 n.1 (September 11, 1995). The use of ``identified,'' rather than ``identifiable,'' is intended to distinguish more clearly between particular matters involving specific parties and mere ``particular matters,'' which are described elsewhere as including matters of general applicability that focus ``on the interests of a discrete and identifiable class of persons'' but do not involve specific parties. 5 CFR 2640.102(m) (emphasis added). See also 5 CFR 2640.103(a)(1); 5 CFR 2635.402(b)(3). The use of the term ``identified,'' however, does not mean that a matter will lack specific parties just because the name of a party is not disclosed to the Government, as [[Page 7854]] where an agent represents an unnamed principal. Consistent with this basic test and with Sec. 2637.201(c)(1), proposed Sec. 2641.201(h)(2) confirms that matters of general applicability are not particular matters involving specific parties. See also Shakeproof Indus. Prod. Div. of Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, 104 F.3d 1309, 1313-14 (Fed. Cir. 1997). As illustrated by the examples following this provision, section 207(a) ordinarily does not prohibit former employees from making representations in connection with general rulemaking, policy and legislative matters, notwithstanding any personal and substantial participation or official responsibility they may have had with respect to such matters as a Federal employee. Proposed Sec. 2641.201(h)(3) indicates that specific parties must be involved, under section 207(a), both at the time the former employee was involved in the matter and at the time of the post-employment representation. This reflects a longstanding interpretation of section 207(a), which was codified in 5 CFR 2637.201(c)(4). Nevertheless, the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 made certain adjustments to the grammatical structure of section 207(a) that may require some explanation. Prior to the 1989 Act, section 207(a) read, in pertinent part: ``Whoever * * * knowingly acts as agent or attorney for, or otherwise represents, any other person * * * in connection with any * * * particular matter involving specific parties * * * in which he participated personally and substantially as an officer or employee * * *.'' In 1989, the language pertaining to specific parties was broken out and moved to its own lettered subparagraph, which now reads: ``(C) which involved a specific party or specific parties at the time of such participation.'' 18 U.S.C. 207(a)(1)(c) (emphasis added).\5\ Based on the legislative history, it appears that the amendment was intended simply to resolve any doubt that specific parties must have been involved at the time that the former employee participated in the matter, not to cast doubt on the well-understood requirement that specific parties must be involved at the time of the representation.\6\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\ Similar language was enacted in 1989 in section 207(a)(2)(C), which pertains to particular matters pending under an employee's official responsibility: ``(C) which involved a specific party or specific parties at the time it was so pending (emphasis added).'' \6\ The leading Senate proponent of the 1989 amendments stated that many of the changes to section 207 ``simply reflect an effort to make the statute more readable.'' 135 Cong. Rec. S15954 (November 17, 1989) (remarks of Sen. Levin). Senator Levin also entered into the record a section-by-section analysis stating that section 207(a)(1) is ``similar to current law'' and describing it as a prohibition against ``lobbying * * * on a particular matter involving specific parties,'' id., which suggests this was not a novel effort to cover matters that do not involve specific parties at the time of the lobbying. Furthermore, the Department of Justice testified at a 1989 hearing with respect to H.R. 9, which contained the same language as the enacted amendments concerning the timing of the specific parties requirement. The Justice Department commented on this aspect of the proposal and specifically noted its consistency with the OGE regulation discussed above: ``The requirement that a specific party must have been involved at the time of the employee's government service clarifies present law in a way that is consistent with current regulations. It means, for example, that a Government employee who helped develop a set of regulations or policies is not precluded from becoming involved in a particular case or matter involving the application of the regulation or policy. See 5 CFR 737.5 (c)[now 5 CFR 2637.201(c)].'' Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, on H.R. 2267 and Related Bills: Post-Employment Restrictions Act of 1989, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 151 (April 27, 1989)(statement of John C. Keeney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Proposed Sec. 2641.201(h)(4) pertains to the related issue of when specific parties can be said to be involved in a particular matter. Section 207(a) can apply to participation in preliminary or informal stages of a particular matter. See, e.g., 2 Op. O.L.C. 313 (1978). Consequently it becomes important to determine, in light of the facts surrounding a given matter, at what point specific parties are first identified. Proposed Sec. 2641.201(h)(4) and the examples that follow are intended to provide guidance in making such determinations. In addition to general guidance applicable to all types of matters, the proposed regulation also provides more specific guidance with respect to contracts, grants, and other agreements, which historically have posed some of the most difficult and recurring questions. See OGE Informal Advisory Letter 96 x 21. Another set of difficult and recurring questions is addressed by proposed Sec. 2641.201(h)(5), which explains the requirement that the same particular matter must be involved both at the time of the former employee's Government service and at the time of post-employment representation. The proposed regulation uses substantially the same test as 5 CFR 2637.201(c)(4), including a similar list of factors that should be taken into consideration, where relevant, in determinations as to whether two matters constitute the same particular matter involving specific parties. The proposed examples following proposed Sec. 2641.201(h)(5) would illustrate the application of some of these factors and draw on various administrative and judicial precedents. E.g., United States v. Medico Indus., Inc., 784 F.2d 840 (7th Cir. 1986); CACI, Inc.-Federal v. United States, 719 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1983); OGE Informal Advisory Letter 93 x 32. For purposes of clarity, one factor was not carried over from the previous list in Sec. 2637.201(c)(4), namely, ``the continuing existence of an important Federal interest''; this factor was thought to add little to the analysis of section 207, since the statute already applies only to matters in which the United States is a party or at least has a ``direct and substantial interest.'' 18 U.S.C. 207(a)(1), (a)(2). The principle reflected in proposed Sec. 2641.105--that the primary responsibility for rendering post-employment advice resides in the ethics official at the agency where the former employee served--is particularly important in connection with these ``same particular matter'' determinations. These questions frequently require an understanding of the specific operations, programs, and missions of the agencies involved. Moreover, there is judicial recognition that agency determinations with respect to the ``same particular matter'' element are ``entitled to weight.'' CACI, 719 F.2d at 1576; see also Shakeproof, 104 F.3d at 1314. This is not to suggest, of course, that deference to the agency is absolute. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Florido, 986 F.Supp. 687 (D.P.R. 1997). Proposed Sec. 2641.201(i)--Participated Personally and Substantially Proposed Sec. 2641.201(i) defines the terms ``participate,'' ``personally,'' and ``substantially.'' The first regulatory definition of these terms for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 207 was published in 1980 at 5 CFR 2637.201(d). When Congress amended section 207 in 1989, it added a statutory definition of ``participated'' at section 207(i)(2). In the 1990s, OGE published regulatory guidance concerning the meaning of these terms in connection with its implementation of 18 U.S.C. 208 at 5 CFR part 2635 and 5 CFR part 2640. The current definitions of ``personal and substantial'' at 5 CFR 2635.401(b)(4) and ``personal and substantial participation'' at 5 CFR 2640.103(a)(2) were patterned closely after definitions in 5 CFR part 2637. The language of proposed Sec. 2641.201(i) deviates somewhat from the language of these existing OGE regulations for several reasons. First, we are proposing to more clearly separate the definitions of the terms ``participate,'' ``personally,'' and ``substantially.'' We would also exactly track the language of the [[Page 7855]] statutory definition of ``participated.'' More significantly, however, we are proposing to include some additional guidance that reflects our experience with several questions arising since publication of the earlier regulations. The first sentence of the definition of ``participate'' at proposed Sec. 2641.201(i)(1) is from 18 U.S.C. 207(i)(2). Consistent with existing guidance at 5 CFR 2637.201(d)(3), the definition then indicates that to participate can also mean to ``purposefully forbear in order to affect the outcome of a matter.'' The proposed definition also distinguishes participation from mere knowledge of a matter and from the definition of ``official responsibility'' as set forth in proposed Sec. 2641.202(j). Additionally, the proposed definition points out that an employee can participate in a particular matter even though it is not pending at his own agency. Finally, it would state that an employee does not participate in a particular matter within the meaning of section 207(a)(1) unless he does so in his official capacity. Under the proposed definition at Sec. 2641.201(i)(2), to participate ``personally'' includes the direct and active supervision of others. The existing regulations refer to active supervision of a ``subordinate.'' As proposed, Sec. 2641.201(i)(2) indicates that the person supervised need not technically be a subordinate. An employee may participate in a matter, for example, by means of direct and active supervision of an employee who is merely on loan from another office. Separately, we are also proposing to make the fairly obvious point that an employee participates in a matter whether he does so ``individually or in combination with other persons.'' The definition of ``substantially'' at proposed Sec. 2641.201(i)(3) closely tracks the definitions of that term in 5 CFR part 2635 and 5 CFR part 2640. However, we are proposing to insert an additional sentence in response to two recent scenarios. The first concerned a former employee's involvement as a Government employee in a meeting with a private sector company. The meeting was preliminary to the company's submission of an application to the Government. The former employee was willing to concede that the meeting and the application were the same ``particular matter.'' He argued, however, that the meeting constituted an aspect of the matter that was insignificant in relation to the application process as a whole and that the former employee's participation was, therefore, insubstantial. In another case, a former employee argued that his participation in a multi-million dollar project had not been substantial since the dollar value of the aspect of the project in which he was involved was insignificant in relation to the dollar value of the project as a whole. The Office of Government Ethics rejected both arguments, noting that in both cases the former employee had made a substantive contribution to the matter. As we propose to explain in Sec. 2641.201(i), ``[p]rovided that an employee participates in the substantive merits of a matter, his participation may be substantial even though his role in the matter, or the aspect of the matter in which he is participating, may be minor in relation to the matter as a whole.'' We have included an additional sentence in the definition at proposed Sec. 2641.201(i)(3) emphasizing that participation in ``peripheral'' aspects of a matter or in aspects not directly involving the substantive merits of a matter is not substantial. We would note, however, that such an aspect might itself constitute a particular matter with respect to which the permanent bar might apply. This is set forth in 5 CFR 2637.201(d)(2) and example 1 following 5 CFR 2637.201(d)(1). Although reworded, proposed examples 1 and 2 following proposed Sec. 2641.201(i) are from existing 5 CFR 2637.201(c) and 2637.201(d). Proposed example 3 would make the point that an employee's participation may be substantial even though her role in the matter may be minor in relation to the matter as a whole. Proposed Sec. 2641.201(j)--United States is a Party or Has a Direct and Substantial Interest Finally, proposed Sec. 2641.201(j) focuses on how to determine whether the United States is a party or has a direct and substantial interest in a particular matter at the time of a former employee's post-employment representational activity. The definition of ``United States'' at proposed Sec. 2641.201(j)(1) is intended to encompass the entire Federal Government. As explained earlier in connection with the definitions in proposed Sec. 2641.104, we cited the definition of ``Government corporation'' in 18 U.S.C. 6 for purposes of defining ``United States'' in proposed Sec. 2641.201(j)(1). Also, as explained below in connection with proposed Sec. 2641.301(a), the Government of the District of Columbia is not encompassed by the term United States. Separately, we note that the proposed definition of United States at Sec. 2641.201(j)(1) encompasses the entire judicial branch. Compare proposed Sec. 2641.201(f) which provides that a representation is not made ``to'' an employee of the United States unless made, inter alia, to an employee of a Federal court. The narrower interpretation in proposed Sec. 2641.201(f) reflects the statutory language ``department, agency, court, or court-martial of the United States'' in 18 U.S.C. 207(a). Proposed Sec. 2641.201(j)(2) specifically states that ``the United States is neither a party to nor does it have a direct and substantial interest in a particular matter merely because a Federal statute is at issue or a Federal court is serving as the forum for resolution of the matter.'' See, e.g., 14 Op. Off. Legal Counsel O.L.C. 139 (June 7, 1990) (predecessors to 18 U.S.C. 207(a)(1) and (a)(2) determined not to bar former employees from serving as trustees in bankruptcy cases unless the United States is a party or has a direct and substantial interest in the bankruptcy proceeding, e.g., if the United States is a creditor of the estate.) Of course, when a former employee wishes to participate in a judicial proceeding concerning the same particular matter with which he was involved while a Government employee, it is likely that his former agency will be a party to or have a direct and substantial interest in the subject of the proceeding or that the agency will itself be serving as the forum. As OGE has noted in relation to 18 U.S.C. 205, determining whether or not the United States has a direct and substantial interest in a particular matter ``may not be easy.'' OGE Informal Advisory Letter 94 x 7. Proposed Sec. 2641.201(j)(2)(i) assigns the primary responsibility for coordinating this determination to the designated agency ethics official at the former employee's agency. This assignment is consistent with the DAEO's responsibility, as specified in proposed Sec. 2641.105(a), to provide advice to a former employee of his agency or to the individual's representative. If any agency has a continuing direct and substantial interest in a matter, we suggest that it will most likely be the agency in which the matter was pending when the former employee worked on it as a Government employee. If the circumstances suggest that another agency may have a direct and substantial interest in the matter, the DAEO should contact an agency ethics official at the other agency. Moreover, we anticipate that an agency's ethics staff will need only pursue resolution of a direct and substantial interest issue when all other elements of 18 U.S.C. 207(a)(1) or 207(a)(2) appear satisfied. [[Page 7856]] As proposed, the regulation does not establish any procedures for the internal coordination of an agency's direct and substantial interest determination. Under proposed Sec. 2641.201(j)(2)(i), it is within an agency's discretion to determine who must be consulted within the agency (or any department of which the agency is a part) in order to determine whether the agency will assert a direct and substantial interest in a particular matter. A DAEO may accept the assurance of another agency's DAEO (or equivalent official in the legislative or judicial branch) that he has been authorized by competent agency authority to convey the agency's direct and substantial interest determination. In making this determination, proposed Sec. 2641.201(j)(2)(ii) provides that appropriate officials shall consider ``all relevant factors.'' Thus, the proposed factors listed in Sec. 2641.201(j)(2)(ii)(A)-(D) are not all-inclusive. We specifically seek public comment concerning useful revisions or additions to our proposed list. Proposed Sec. 2641.202--18 U.S.C. 207(a)(2) All relevant statutory changes that were made to 18 U.S.C. 207(a)(1) by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 were also made to section 207(a)(2), formerly section 207(b)(i), a two-year bar which similarly applies to all ``former employees.'' Proposed Sec. 2641.202(b) provides cross-references to the appropriate paragraphs of proposed Sec. 2641.301 for each of the exceptions and waivers that in certain circumstances negate the prohibition contained in section 207(a)(2). As sections 207(a)(1) and (a)(2) are identical except for their duration and the degree of involvement in a particular matter during Government service necessary to trigger the restriction, proposed Sec. 2641.202(d)-(i) cross-reference relevant portions of proposed Sec. 2641.201 relating to the permanent bar. Proposed Sec. 2641.201(j)--Official Responsibility The first sentence of the definition of ``official responsibility'' in proposed Sec. 2641.202(j)(1) quotes the statutory definition of the term in 18 U.S.C. 202(b). In addition, consistent with existing guidance at 5 CFR 2637.202, proposed Sec. 2641.202(j)(1) explains that the scope of an employee's official responsibility is ordinarily determined by statute, regulation, Executive order, job description, or delegation of authority. Example 1 following proposed Sec. 2641.202(j) emphasizes that subject matter jurisdiction assigned by position description is not removed from the scope of an employee's official responsibilities merely because the employee does not actually exercise his authority to direct Government action in that subject area. Proposed Sec. 2641.202(j)(1), drawing from existing 5 CFR 2637.202(b)(2), emphasizes the potential breadth of the term ``official responsibility,'' noting that ``[a]ll particular matters under consideration in an agency are under the official responsibility of the agency head and each is under that of any intermediate supervisor who supervises a person, including a subordinate, who actually participates in the matter or who has been assigned to participate in the matter within the scope of his duties'' (emphasis added). The highlighted language is new. It is intended to make clear that a supervisor can have official responsibility for a pending matter even though his subordinate has not yet retrieved the assigned matter from his in-box or, although having retrieved it, has not yet worked on it ``personally and substantially.'' This language would also make it clear that a supervisor need not have personally assigned the matter to the subordinate, provided the matter is pending with the subordinate and it falls within the scope of the subordinate's official duties. Proposed example 3 would emphasize the requirement that the assigned matter fall within the scope of the supervised employee's official duties. On the other hand, the proposed language is intended to indicate that an employee can have official responsibility for a matter even though he exercises only nominal supervision over the person actually doing the work; the supervised employee need not be a true subordinate. Thus, for example, OGE has advised that a former employee had official responsibility for a matter even though all work on a project was being accomplished by employees ``on loan'' from another office. As drafted, proposed Sec. 2641.202(j) indicates that a nonsupervisory subordinate is not deemed to have official responsibility for a matter to which he has been assigned, whether or not he has begun to work on it. But see United States v. Coleman, 805 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1986) (affirming conviction of nonsupervisory employee for violation of 18 U.S.C. 207(b)(i), the predecessor to section 207(a)(2).) Proposed example 4 following proposed Sec. 2641.202(j) emphasizes, however, that the nature of a nonsupervisory employee's participation in a particular matter could potentially make her subject to the permanent section 207(a)(1) bar as to that matter. Existing 5 CFR 2637.202(b)(3) provides that authority for an ``ancillary'' consideration does not constitute responsibility for the particular matter as a whole. As proposed, Sec. 2641.202(j)(1) continues to make the point that responsibility for ancillary matters, such as budgeting, or equal employment considerations, does not constitute official responsibility for the whole of a matter. Proposed example 2 following Sec. 2641.202(j) illustrates this point. The proposed guidance makes the additional point that responsibility for nonsubstantive aspects of a matter similarly does not cause an employee's official responsibility to extend to the whole of a substantive matter. Guidance in proposed Sec. 2641.202(j)(2) concerning the meaning of ``actually pending'' also derives from existing guidance in 5 CFR 2637.202. New language clarifies that a supervisory employee acquires official responsibility for a matter as soon as it is referred to him for assignment, regardless of whether he subsequently assigns the matter to another employee or retains it for his own action. Thus, proposed Sec. 2641.202(j)(2) provides that a supervisory employee acquires official responsibility for any matter referred to the employee ``for assignment.'' In proposed example 5, the General Counsel is said to have acquired official responsibility for a certain matter as soon as it was referred to him as an issue requiring action by the legal department. In addition, as already noted, the proposed guidance notes that there is no requirement that a matter have been pending under an individual's official responsibility for any particular length of time. See, e.g., OGE Informal Advisory Letter 94 x 13. In proposed example 5, therefore, it would be enough that the particular matter had been pending under the General Counsel's official responsibility for 2 days. Proposed Sec. 2641.202(j)(2) also indicates that a matter remains pending when it is not under ``active'' consideration, as discussed in OGE Informal Advisory Letter 85 x 6. Proposed example 6 is a reworded version of the current example following 5 CFR 2637.202(c). Proposed Sec. 2641.202(j)(3) addresses the applicability of section 207(a)(2) with respect to particular matters that fell within an employee's official responsibility only by virtue of a temporary assignment to a position. We recognize that while on detail or serving in an acting capacity, a temporary supervisor can potentially establish [[Page 7857]] policies, gain information, decide issues, and make contacts that may serve him well in his post-Government life. On the other hand, in proposing this regulatory provision, we sought to balance the concerns underlying section 207(a)(2) against the likelihood that a temporary assignment would permit an employee to acquire the knowledge and experience necessary to make those concerns legitimate. Such assignments occur frequently throughout the executive branch, sometimes lasting only a few days or otherwise involving circumstances indicating that the employee had no reasonable expectation of being able to exercise the full authority of the position. In many cases, where the employee functions only in a limited ``caretaker'' role, it seems remote that the policy concerns underlying section 207(a)(2) would be implicated. Although we were unable to establish a bright line test for determining when temporary duties implicate section 207(a)(2), we are proposing a nonexclusive list of factors that agencies can utilize in making such determinations, as set out in proposed Sec. 2641.202(j)(3)(i)-(iv). Proposed Sec. 2641.202(j)(4) indicates that ``[t]he scope of an employee's official responsibility is not affected by annual leave, terminal leave, sick leave, excused absence, leave without pay, or similar absence from assigned duties.'' Related Sec. 2641.202(j)(5) as proposed would state that ``[o]fficial responsibility for a matter is not eliminated through self-disqualification or avoidance of personal participation in a matter * * *.'' Thus, a matter is not removed from an employee's official responsibility when he recuses himself from participation in the matter due to a conflicting financial or personal interest or during a job search as required by subparts D, E, and F of 5 CFR part 2635 and 5 CFR part 2640. Example 8 following proposed Sec. 2641.202(j) is illustrative. This interpretation is consistent with United States v. Dorfman 542 F. Supp. 402 (N.D. Ill. 1982), in which the court advised that a U.S. Attorney's recusal coupled with assignment of a particular matter to a ``first assistant'' would not remove the case from the U.S. Attorney's official responsibility. The court cited 5 CFR 737.7 (now 5 CFR 2637.202(b)(5)), a provision which was also the subject of OGE Informal Advisory Letter 86 x 2. As interpreted by OGE in that advisory letter, a contract could be removed from an employee's official responsibility if he had ``not only the contract but also the actual function dealing with the contract removed from his duties under his position description.'' Proposed Sec. 2641.202(j)(5)) recognizes that the scope of an employee's official responsibility may be changed by an amendment of a position description. Proposed Sec. 2641.202(j)(6) does not explicitly address the scope of the term ``official responsibility'' in the case of an employee whose Government service lasted less than one year and was preceded by a break in Government service. However, proposed example 9 does provide our interpretation of the application of section 207(a)(2) where there has been a break in service in the last year of the former employee's Government service. By way of background, this issue was brought to our attention when a former high-ranking employee, after a break in service lasting a few months, agreed to serve as an SGE for a short period of time. When he left Government the second time, less than one year had passed since serving in his previous Government job. We noted that an initial section 207(a)(2) bar would have commenced at the end of his first period of Government service. The issue was whether the section 207(a)(2) bar triggered by his second departure from Government should apply to particular matters for which he had responsibility during his first period of service (provided they were actually pending within the one-year period prior to his termination from his second Government job.) We determined that the second section 207(a)(2) restriction applied only to those particular matters that were actually pending under his official responsibility during his most recent period of Government service. (Of course, any section 207(a)(2) restriction remaining from the employee's termination from Government service immediately preceding the break in service would still be in effect.) Section 207(a)(2) also requires that the particular matter be one that the former employee ``knows or reasonably should know'' was pending under his official responsibility during his last year of Government service. As described in existing part 2637, section 207(a)(2) had been interpreted to mean that the restriction would not apply to a former employee ``unless at the time of the proposed representation of another, he or she knows or learns that the matter had been under his or her responsibility.'' The proposed new guidance similarly provides that it is the former employee's knowledge at the time of the post-employment representation that is critical. Thus, the last sentence of proposed Sec. 2641.202(j)(7) notes that ``[i]t is not necessary that a former employee have known during his Government service that the matter was actually pending under his official responsibility.'' Proposed Sec. 2641.202(j)(7) makes it clear that it is enough that the former employee ``reasonably should know'' at the time of his post- employment representation that the matter was actually pending under his official responsibility within his last year of Government service. We are proposing to include a note following Sec. 2641.202(j) of the new regulation that would warn an employee that prudence dictates that he make inquiry ``when the facts suggest that a particular matter involving specific parties could have been actually pending under his official responsibility'' (emphasis added). The proposed note cross- references the provision in proposed Sec. 2641.105(d) stating that an employee will not be deemed to violate section 207 when he contacts an employee of the United States for purposes of determining the applicability or meaning of section 207 as applied to his own activities. Proposed Sec. 2641.203--18 U.S.C. 207(b) Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 207(b), a former employee may not utilize specified nonpublic information to assist another person in relation to certain ongoing trade or treaty negotiations in which the former employee participated personally and substantially during his last year of Government service. The prohibition lasts for one year or until the termination of the negotiation, whichever occurs first. Enacted by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 to protect sensitive Government information relating to certain trade or treaty negotiations, section 207(b) represents a significant departure from the earlier post-employment restrictions of section 207 since, like section 207(f) discussed below, it extends to ``behind-the-scenes'' assistance. While OGE intends to publish comprehensive regulatory guidance concerning 18 U.S.C. 207(b), Sec. 2641.203 of this proposed rule includes only a brief introductory summary of the restriction and paragraphs concerning applicable exceptions and waivers, and the commencement and duration of the restriction. We have reserved Sec. 2641.203(d)-(i) for additional guidance. To date, OGE's written guidance relating to 18 U.S.C. 207(b) remains the interpretation of the restriction that was distributed by means of a memorandum dated October 26, 1990, which was published as OGE Informal Advisory Letter 90 x 17. OGE reissued updated [[Page 7858]] versions of the memorandum on November 5, 1992 and again on February 17, 2000, by a Memorandum to Designated Agency Ethics Officials, General Counsels, and Inspectors General. Although the 1992 and 2000 memoranda incorporate a few substantive changes, none affects our original 1990 summary of section 207(b). The February 2000 updated summary is available on our Web site under ``DAEOgrams,'' at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.usoge.gov . Proposed Sec. 2641.204--18 U.S.C. 207(c) Section 207(c) of title 18, United States Code, is the one-year ``cooling-off'' restriction that prohibits a former ``senior employee'' from communicating to or appearing before his former agency, on behalf of another person, with the intent to influence official action. The statutory language of section 207(c) was substantially revised by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989. As noted earlier, OGE published interim regulatory guidance in February 1991 at part 2641 concerning section 207(c) as amended by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989. That rule set forth several definitions in connection with the establishment of interim procedures for the granting of exemptions and designation of components for purposes of section 207(c). As discussed above, in connection with proposed section 2641.104, we are proposing to make certain changes to the interim definitions in existing part 2641. (Our proposed changes to the existing exemption and component designation procedures at 5 CFR 2641.201(d) and (e) are discussed further below in connection with renumbered proposed Sec. Sec. 2641.301(j) and 2641.302.) Proposed Sec. 2641.204(a) confirms that an executive branch employee can be subject to either 18 U.S.C. 207(c) or 207(d) but not both. Like section 207(d), section 207(c) states that the restriction applies ``[i]n addition to the restrictions set forth in subsections (a) and (b).'' Moreover, section 207(c)(2)(A) states that the section 207(c) bar ``shall apply to a person (other than a person subject to the restrictions of subsection (d)) * * *.'' Accordingly, Sec. 2641.204(a) as proposed would specifically provide that a former ``very senior employee'' is subject to the one-year cooling-off restriction set forth in section 207(d) in lieu of that set forth in section 207(c). Proposed Sec. 2641.204(b) provides cross-references to the appropriate paragraphs of proposed Sec. 2641.301 for the exemption, exceptions, and waivers that in certain circumstances would negate the prohibition contained in 18 U.S.C. 207(c). Proposed Sec. 2641.204(c)(1) concerns the application of 18 U.S.C. 207(c) to special Government employees (SGEs). Since its enactment in 1978, section 207(c) has not applied to an SGE who served the Government fewer than 60 days during a statutorily specified time frame. As revised by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, the current language of the statute provides that the one-year cooling-off period ``shall not apply to a special Government employee who serves less than 60 days in the 1-year period before his or her service or employment as such employee terminates.'' Proposed renumbered Sec. 2641.204(c)(1) confirms that the ``60 days'' refers to the number of days in which an employee served as an SGE and not to the number of days in which he served as a senior employee. We are proposing to include a sentence in Sec. 2641.204(c)(1) which addresses the manner in which the 60-day period should be computed for purposes of determining the applicability of section 207(c) to a former senior SGE. Guidance concerning the counting of days in connection with the service of SGEs was contained in the former Federal Personnel Manual and has been endorsed in OGE informal advisory letters and OLC opinions. Consistent with that guidance, Sec. 2641.204(c)(1) as proposed would state that ``[a]ny day on which work is performed shall count toward the 60-day threshold without regard to the number of hours worked on that day or whether the day falls on a weekend or holiday.'' See e.g., OGE Informal Advisory Letter 84 x 4 and 7 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 123 (1983). The first example following proposed Sec. 2641.204(c) illustrates the proper method of counting the 60 days in the case of an SGE. It should be noted, however, that certain de minimis activities performed by an SGE on a given day might not be sufficient to count that day, under limited circumstances. See Manning, supra, at 28. The Office of Government Ethics has acknowledged a narrow de minimis standard where the activity is insignificant, both in terms of substance and in terms of the amount of time expended, and the SGE is not compensated by the Government specifically for that particular effort. An example would be a day on which the SGE did nothing more for the Government than make a brief telephone call to confirm the date of an official meeting. Proposed Sec. 2641.204(c)(1) would also specify the manner in which an SGE's rate of basic pay should be calculated for purposes of determining whether the rate of basic pay that he receives for his part-time or intermittent work is equal to or greater than the rate of basic pay payable for ES-5 within the meaning of section 207(c)(2)(A)(ii). Proposed 2641.204(c)(2) concerns the application of 18 U.S.C. 207(c) to certain appointees or detailees. Specifically, this provision sets out those circumstances in which it has been determined that an individual appointed or detailed to an agency pursuant to the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA), 5 U.S.C. 3371-3376, is subject to the restrictions of section 207(c). See ``Applicability of the Post- Employment Restrictions of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 207(c) to Assignees Under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act,'' Memorandum of Daniel L. Koffsky, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, to Susan F. Beard, Acting Assistant General Counsel, Department of Energy, June 26, 2000. Proposed Sec. 2641.204(d) emphasizes that 18 U.S.C. 207(c) is triggered upon termination from a senior employee position, not from termination of Government service, unless the two events occur simultaneously. (This interpretation applies equally with respect to sections 207(d) and 207(f) as specified in proposed Sec. Sec. 2641.205(c) and 2641.206(c), respectively.) The two examples following proposed Sec. 2641.204(d) illustrate the timing of the section 207(c) restriction in the case of a senior employee who moves from one agency to another. Since the restriction can run while an individual continues to serve as a Government employee, the first example cross-references proposed Sec. 2641.301(a) which states that communications and appearances are permissible if made during the course of performing official duties as an employee of the United States. In the second example, the individual does not cease to be a senior employee until he terminates his senior position at the second agency. As 18 U.S.C 207(c) and the permanent bar share several elements in common, proposed Sec. 2641.201 is cross-referenced several times in proposed Sec. 2641.204. For example, both section 207(a)(1) and 207(c) require that there be a communication or appearance made with the intent to influence, although in the case of section 207(c), the representation is prohibited only if made to the former senior employee's former agency. Section 2641.201 is also cross-referenced for its proposed definition of ``on behalf of any other person.'' [[Page 7859]] Section 2641.204(g)--To or Before Employee of Former Agency Proposed Sec. 2641.204(g)(1) defines ``to or before employee of former agency.'' This provision is different from proposed Sec. 2641.201(f) because that section focuses on employees ``of the United States'' rather than employees at the senior employee's ``former agency.'' The term ``employee'' is defined in proposed Sec. 2641.204(g)(1) for purposes of identifying the individuals to whom a former senior employee may not direct a communication or appearance. Proposed Sec. 2641.204(g)(1)(ii) reflects the fact that an individual serving in an agency pursuant to the IPA is deemed an ``employee'' of that agency and, hence, is an individual to whom a former senior employee of that agency may not direct a communication or appearance. Notably, the definition of employee at proposed Sec. 2641.204(g)(1) also includes an individual detailed to a former senior employee's former agency. Section 207(g) of the statute provides that ``a person who is detailed from one department, agency, or other entity to another department, agency, or other entity shall, during the period such person is detailed, be deemed to be an officer or employee of both * * *.'' As reflected in proposed Sec. 2641.204(g)(2)(iii), we interpreted this statutory provision to mean that an employee is barred from contacting any agency to which he was detailed during his last year of senior service, regardless of the duration of the detail. We also decided, however, that section 207(g) is relevant when identifying those employees serving in a former senior employee's former agency to whom a communication or appearance cannot be directed. Accordingly, proposed Sec. 2641.204(g)(1)(iii) specifies that the term employee encompasses an individual detailed from an agency to the former senior employee's former agency. As noted earlier, 18 U.S.C. 207(i)(1)(A) states that ``the term `officer or employee', when used to describe the person to whom a communication is made or before whom an appearance is made * * * shall include in subsections (a), (c), and (d), the President and the Vice President * * *.'' Under the proposed rule, a former senior employee of the Executive Office of the President is barred from contacting not only employees of that Office, but also the President and Vice President. On the other hand, former senior or very senior employees who formerly served in entities other than the Executive Office of the President would not be barred by section 207(c) or (d) from contacting the President or Vice President. This reasoning is reflected in proposed Sec. 2641.204(g)(1)(v); proposed Sec. 2641.204(g) is cross- referenced in Sec. 2641.205(f) as proposed for purposes of the section 207(d) restrictions. The definitions of ``department'' and ``agency'' in proposed Sec. 2641.104, combined with the proposed guidance in Sec. 2641.204(g)(2), are key to understanding the scope of 18 U.S.C. 207(c). As we noted earlier in connection with the definition of ``agency'' in proposed Sec. 2641.104, we specifically included independent agencies (not in the legislative or judicial branches) within that definition. As already mentioned, and as explained further below in connection with proposed Sec. 2641.302, the Director of OGE is authorized to designate distinct and separate agency components for purposes of section 207(c). The designation of such components within an agency has the effect of narrowing the scope of the restriction as applied to former senior employees eligible to benefit from such designations. Proposed Sec. 2641.204(g)(2)(i) emphasizes that the 18 U.S.C. 207(c) bar applies only with respect to an agency in which the former employee served within his last year of service as a senior employee. Example 3 following proposed Sec. 2641.204(g) illustrates the application of section 207(c) when a former senior employee's period of Government service was preceded by a break in Government service. Consistent with past interpretation, 18 U.S.C. 207(c) is described in proposed Sec. 2641.204(g)(2)(ii) as extending to any agency in which a former senior employee served in any capacity prior to his termination from a senior position, ``regardless of his position, rate of basic pay, or pay grade.'' See, e.g., OGE Memorandum to Designated Agency Ethics Officials, General Counsels, and Inspectors General (February 17, 2000), available under ``DAEOgrams'' on OGE's Web site, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.usoge.gov. Thus, the former employee in proposed example 2 following Sec. 2641.204(g) is barred as to both the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Export-Import Bank of the United States even though she served in only a GS-15 position at the CFTC. Proposed Sec. 2641.204(g)(2)(iii) explains that, in addition to a detail, an employee may otherwise be deemed to be serving two entities simultaneously. The regulation would recognize that many employees are required to serve on committees or similar entities as a collateral duty. The regulation would specify that an employee will be deemed an employee of such an entity if required to serve pursuant to statute or Executive order. Defining the boundaries of an employee's former agency is key to the proper interpretation of 18 U.S.C. 207(c). Proposed Sec. 2641.204(g)(2)(iv) addresses situations where organizational changes affecting an agency could make it difficult to determine if a successor agency is substantially the same as a former senior employee's former employing entity. For example, subsequent to an employee's termination from a senior employee position, his former employing entity could be made larger or smaller, merged in whole or in part with another agency, or even abolished. Significantly, proposed Sec. 2641.204(g)(2)(iv) need not be consulted unless the agency to which 18 U.S.C 207(c) applies ``has been significantly altered by organizational changes after [a senior employee's] termination from senior service * * *.'' Thus, it is not necessary to consult Sec. 2641.204(g)(2)(iv) as proposed merely because the name of a former senior employee's former agency has changed or because some personnel have retired or transferred. If, however, an organizational change is such that the former senior employee's former employing entity ``is not identifiable as substantially the same agency from which the former senior employee terminated * * *'', then the guidance in proposed Sec. 2641.204(g)(2)(iv)(A) applies and the section 207(c) bar will not apply with respect to that entity. See OGE Informal Advisory Letter 85 x 5 and example 4 following proposed Sec. 2641.204(g). Under proposed Sec. 2641.204(g)(2)(iv)(B), a former senior employee's 18 U.S.C. 207(c) bar will extend to the whole of an employing entity that has been affected by organizational changes if it ``remains identifiable as substantially the same entity'' from which he terminated. Proposed example 5 emphasizes that a former employee would be barred from contacting current employees who had joined the new employing entity, but would not be barred from contacting an employee who had been transferred elsewhere. Under proposed Sec. 2641.204(g)(2)(iv)(C), if a former employing entity is made separate but otherwise remains ``substantially the same,'' the section 207(c) bar would apply with respect to the separate entity. Proposed Sec. 2641.204(g)(2)(iv) would require designated agency ethics officials to provide counseling in consultation with OGE when the scope [[Page 7860]] of section 207(c) is at issue as a result of an agency reorganization. The guidance concerning the meaning of ``to or before'' in proposed Sec. 2641.204(g)(3) closely tracks the corollary guidance in proposed Sec. 2641.201 as does the guidance at proposed Sec. 2641.204(g)(4) concerning public commentary. The guidance is repeated in Sec. 2641.204 as proposed only because it has been tailored to the one-year restriction which is aimed only at communications to or appearances before an individual's former agency. Proposed Sec. 2641.204(h), concerning the phrase ``on behalf of any other person'', similarly cites the corollary discussion in proposed Sec. 2641.201(g). As amended by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, 18 U.S.C. 207(c) prohibits a former senior employee from making certain communications or appearances on behalf of ``any other person'' in connection with ``any matter on which such person seeks official action'' (emphasis added). The guidance at proposed Sec. 2641.204(i)(1) reflects that the reference to ``such person'' refers to the former senior employee. Proposed Sec. 2641.204(i)--Matter in Which Former Employee Seeks Official Action Proposed Sec. 2641.204(i)(2) emphasizes that a communication or appearance can be prohibited even if not in connection with a ``particular'' matter or a ``particular matter involving a specific party or parties.'' The adjective ``particular'' does not appear in the section 207(c). See 17 OP. Off. Legal Counsel. 37, 41-42 (1993) (describing effect of 1989 amendments to statute). Thus, proscribed contacts include those made in connection with ``[b]road policy options that are directed to a large and diverse group of persons.'' Compare 5 CFR 2637.204(d). See also 5 CFR 2640.103(a)(1) and 2635.402(b)(3). Consistent with existing part 2637, proposed Sec. 2641.204(i)(2)(iii) emphasizes that a communication or appearance may be barred even though made i